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Abstract
Security policy models allow reasoning about security goals achievements. When security mech-
anisms are implemented, it is diﬃcult to formally validate the security properties against the
security goals especially in a network environment. To assess the implemented security proper-
ties, one should consider details regarding the network topology, the forwarding as well as ﬁltering
and transform engines. In this paper, we present a Colored Petri Net based tool which allows to
describe graphically a given network topology, the network security mechanisms and the security
goals required. The tool computes the diﬀerent functionalities to set up the security properties and
formally validates the solution using the dead state of the generated reachability graph analysis.
Diﬀerent security properties such as conﬁdentiality and availability can be studied.
Keywords: Network Security, Security Management, Colored Petri Nets.
1 Introduction
The design, operation, and maintenance of network conﬁgurations constitute
an important part of the security management task. Basically, the security
of distributed applications is supported by a set of network security services
which are implemented by means of security mechanisms.
The administrator should determine the security services to use and the
security mechanisms conﬁgurations to apply. Once deployed, network security
1 Email: {laborde, nasser, grasset, barrere, benzekri}@irit.fr
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 121 (2005) 117–142
1571-0661      © 2005 Elsevier B.V. 
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2004.10.011
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 
policies often become unmanageable over time since more rules are added
and there is a real diﬃculty in retrieving, managing and getting rid of old
unnecessary rules. This fact leads to ever increasing pains in managing active
security policies in network devices.
Traditional management platforms which use SNMP agents are too simple
to tackle the problem complexity. For this reason, diﬀerent architectures and
techniques have recently appeared which increase the management agents’
capacities in order to automate the management task.
In this context we ﬁnd the policy based management approach which con-
siders abstract security policies [4,12,18,20,33,34] that can be represented at
diﬀerent levels [25,30], ranging from business goals to device-speciﬁc conﬁgu-
ration parameters. The process that transforms a deﬁnite goal into the corre-
sponding conﬁgurations is called derivation process [2,24,31]. With a similar
perspective the multi-agent system paradigm based approach [14] wishes the
management agents to be more autonomous in order to be able to cooperate
for creating strategies that fulﬁll to deﬁned objectives. The terms strategies
objectives employed here take after the policy abstraction level in the former
approach. Finally as a third approach, the latest emerging works [36,37,38,39]
proceed with this idea by the “Self-Adaptive Autonomic Computing” concept
using the preﬁx “self” as a leitmotiv.
However, the automation sought after via the above cited approaches, is
not adequate for security management yet. There is no automatic evaluation
method of network security policies indeed. Access control models [5,9,29]
provide a solution for the deﬁnition of security objectives.
In fact they aﬀord a formal technique for deﬁning what is and what is not
allowed. Moreover, there are several techniques besides, associated [7,9,28,32]
with each model, to guarantee that a security policy is correct.
Nevertheless, these models do not consider the associated security mecha-
nisms or strategies. Network security management is by nature a distributed
function supplied by the coordination of a variety of devices with diﬀerent ca-
pabilities (PCs, routers, secure gateways, ﬁrewalls, etc). By consequence the
same objective can be enforced by diﬀerent compositions thus diﬀerent strate-
gies. For example, conﬁdentiality can be implemented by ﬁltering mechanisms
or encryption mechanisms. It is then necessary to develop an automated for-
mal evaluation technique for deﬁning what a correct security network strategy
is.
There is a variety of formal veriﬁcation techniques used in the security
context: theorem provers (EHDM [22], PVS [27]) and model checking/ﬁnding
techniques (SMV [6], NPA [21], Alloy [13]). All formal speciﬁcation languages
such as Z, LOTOS or Petri Nets [16,19] were also used. Unfortunately, there
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is no model associated with network security proposed to be used with these
techniques. Accordingly, we propose a new formal veriﬁcation tool which is
speciﬁc to network security policy. It includes a model of the application
security policies, the network security policies/mechanisms and the network
topology.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain what is meant
by network security from our perspective. In section 3, we deﬁne our formal
speciﬁcation language and our formal evaluation method. In section 4, we
present our tool which implements the previous concepts and automates the
evaluation task. Also, we expose a small example of use. Finally, in section
6, we show our conclusions and our plans for future work.
2 Definition of a network security policy
Among the access control models [5,29], we have chosen the NIST RBAC
model [9] because it simpliﬁes the management tasks. Actually, the role con-
cept allows aggregating the users’ permissions and then it facilitates the users’
rights modiﬁcations made by an administrator. Moreover, the hierarchies be-
tween roles represent a good tool for modelling an organization according to
diﬀerent points of view.
2.1 The NIST RBAC model
The NIST group proposes the standardization of the RBAC model [9]. It is
made up of two sub-models: the core model and the hierarchical model (Fig.
1). The core model includes ﬁve sets of basic data elements:
• A “user” is an active entity, i.e., human or intelligent agent.
• A “role” is a job function within the context of an organization with some
associated semantic regarding the authority and responsibility on the user
assigned to the role. We can notice that the deﬁnition is very vague.
• A “permission” is an approval to perform an operation on one or more
protected objects.
• An “operation” is an executable image of a program, which upon invocation
executes some function on behalf of the user.
• An “object” is an entity that contains or receives information.
Finally, a set of roles is assigned to a user, and a set of permissions is assigned
to a role. A session is a mapping of one user to a set of authorized roles.
The hierarchical model adds relations for supporting role hierarchies. There
exist diﬀerent approaches for constructing a role hierarchy: based on privileges
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[26] or based on users’ job functions [8,23].
2.2 What is the relation between an application security policy and a network
security policy?
When a user accesses a service, a set of data ﬂow is exchanged between the de-
vice which the user launches the service and the devices supporting the service
execution (Fig. 2). So, a relation between a network security policy and an
application security policy can be perceived. For example, if the application se-
curity policy states that user u1 can read object o1- noted (u1, o1,+read), then
it implies that a corresponding data ﬂow flow(o1,+read) between the device
of user u1 and the device of o1 can exists on the network. Consequently, the
associated network security policy must allows the data ﬂows flow(o1,+read)
between these two devices - noted (device(u1) ↔ device(o1),+flow(o1, read)).
Conversely, if the application security policy states that user u2 cannot read
object o2 noted (u2, o2,−read), there should not be a ﬂow flow(o2, read) be-
tween the devices of u2 and o2. Therefore, the network security policy must
forbid flow(o2, read) between the devices of u2 and o2, i.e., (device(u2) ↔
device(o2),−flow(o2, read)). We report this information from application to
network level, in order to stop these data ﬂows and so to prevent Deny of
Service or exploits/payloads based attacks.
Definition 2.1 The derivation relation noted ⇒d is deﬁned as
∀u ∈ USERS, ∀o ∈ OBJECTS, ∀a ∈ ACTIONS,
(u, o,±a)⇒d (device(u)↔ device(o), f low(o,±a)). (1)
2.3 Towards an “RBAC network security policy”
Users are considered in an RBAC system by their assigned role. Consequently,
the derivation relation becomes: ∀r ∈ ROLES, ∀oi ∈ OBJECTS, ∀opj ∈
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OPERATIONS, ∀u, u′ ∈ USERS, u = u′ • (r, (opj, oi)) ∧ assigned(u, r) ∧
¬assigned(u′, r)⇒d (device(u)↔ device(oi),+flow(oi, opj)) ∧ (device(u′) ↔
device(oi),−flow(oi, opj)).
Hereafter, we consider that there is no hierarchy and that roles have disjoint
privileges (if this is not the case, we may create a partition of this set): such a
constraint will help us to group data ﬂows based on the permissions assigned
to one role and then identifying them by the role. Afterward, we note by the
name of the role the set of ﬂows corresponding to the permissions assigned to
the role.
According to these deﬁnitions, we present our method that includes a net-
work architecture speciﬁcation language and a security mechanisms validation
against an RBAC security policy process.
3 Network architecture model and security mechanisms
analysis
In a network environment, all the applicable treatments on data ﬂow can be
brought together into four categories of functionalities:
• Mechanisms that consume/produce data ﬂows such as the end-systems,
• Mechanisms that propagate data ﬂows such as the supports of communica-
tion,
• Mechanisms that transform data ﬂows into another one such as the security
protocols,
• Mechanisms that ﬁlter data ﬂows such as the ﬁrewall ones.
So, our process consists of modeling these functionalities and interactions be-
tween these functionalities. Hence, we deﬁne a graphical language with a
formal semantic in order to support the network security policy veriﬁcation
process.
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In our model (Fig. 3), we ﬁnd a set of active entities and a set of passive
entities, and a set of functionalities (end-ﬂow, channel, transform and ﬁlter)
which act on information ﬂows. An active entity corresponds to a user in the
RBAC model, and a passive entity is a set of objects in the RBAC model.
We describe the semantic of our language using the Colored Petri Nets
(CPNs). CPNs [15,17] provide a framework for the construction and analysis
of distributed and concurrent systems. A CPN model of a system describes the
states in which the system may be and the transitions between these states.
3.1 Colored Petri Nets
The states of a CPN are represented by means of places (which are drawn
as ellipses or circles). Each place has an associated type (color set) deter-
mining the kind of data that the place may contain. A state of a CPN is
called a marking. It consists of a number of tokens positioned (distributed)
on the individual places. Each token carries a value (color), which belongs
to the type of the place on which the token resides. The tokens present on a
particular place are called the marking of that place. The tokens of a CPN
are distinguishable from each other and hence “colored”, in contrast to low
level Petri nets which have “black” indistinguishable tokens. The marking of
a place is, in general, a multi-set of token values. A multi-set is similar to a
set, except that there may be several appearances of the same element. This
means that a place may have several tokens with the same token value. For
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example, 1‘c1 + +2‘c2 means that the place contains 3 tokens, one with the
value c1 and two with the value c2. The actions of a CPN are represented by
means of transitions (which are drawn as rectangles). Transitions and places
are connected by arcs. The actions of a CPN consist of occurrences of transi-
tions. An occurrence of a transition removes tokens from places connected to
incoming arcs (input places), and adds tokens to places connected to outgoing
arcs (output places), thereby changing the marking (state) of the CPN. The
exact number of tokens added and removed by the occurrence of a transition,
and their data values are determined by the arc expressions. In addition to the
arc expressions, it is possible to attach a boolean expression (with variables)
to each transition. The boolean expression is called a guard. It speciﬁes that
we only accept bindings for which the boolean expression evaluates to true.
A CPN has a distinguished marking - the initial marking - which is used to
describe the initial state of the system. A CPN may also have one or more
markings - dead markings - which cannot generate any other marking. They
describe the dead states of the system.
Nevertheless, CPNs do not bring any additional power of description com-
pared to the PNs, they just allow a compression of information. Any marked
CPN can thus be associated with an isomorphic PN. The phase of transfor-
mation of a CPN into a PN is called the “unfolding”. Afterwards, the analysis
is performed with the CPN or the PN (temporal logic with occurrence graph,
linear algebra with incidence matrix, classical PN properties).
3.2 Deﬁnition of the functionalities
We model data ﬂows with tokens. The characteristics of data ﬂows (source,
destination, service used) are represented by the tokens’ colors. Each func-
tionality is modelled by a speciﬁc CPN sub-network that acts on the tokens.
Then, a CPN model of a speciﬁcation is an interconnection of sub-networks.
We thus deﬁne a total function that maps all speciﬁcation into a sub-set of
CPN. This component approach makes it possible to transform a speciﬁcation
into an equivalent CPN in an automatic way.
3.2.1 The end-ﬂow functionality
An end-ﬂow (EF) is a functionality that is speciﬁc to end-systems, i.e., data
and application servers as well as workstations. It transmits applications/users
ﬂows to the network. Thus, the functionalities which produce/consume data
ﬂows are speciﬁed by CPN sub-nets that generate tokens with correspond-
ing colors and receive tokens (Fig. 4). We consider two types of end-ﬂow
functionalities:
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Fig. 4. The end-ﬂow functionality CPN model
• Active End Flow functionality (AEF): An EF is said active if any active
entity is connected to this EF.
• Passive End Flow functionality (PEF): An EF is said passive if any passive
entity is connected to this EF.
We append a list of roles to each EF for indicating the ﬂows that the EF
can produce. The list corresponds to the set of roles assigned to the user
representing the connected active entity for an AEF. In the case of a PEF, it
is the set of roles assigned to the permissions that concern an object of the
connected passive entity. In a CPN built from one of our speciﬁcation, a token
corresponds to a particular ﬂow.
Consequently, a token is a tuple < SENDER,ROLE, TY PE,NAME >
that deﬁnes the color domain FLOW where:
• SENDER ∈ {AEF, PEF},
• ROLE ∈ ROLES that is the set of roles,
• TY PE ∈ {EF, TR} means that the ﬂow is transformed or not (see “The
transform functionality”),
• NAME is the name of the end-ﬂow functionality.
We specify the producer ability with a place (ef emi ) that initially contains
all data ﬂow tokens that the end-ﬂow functionality can send (that is⋃
assigned ef(R,efi)
1′ < SENDER,ROLE,EF,NAME >) and transition (tefi)
to connect it to another functionality. Its consumer capability is represented
by one place (ef reci ) that stores the received tokens.
3.2.2 The channel functionality
The channel functionality models the physical network. It receives the ﬂow on
an interface and retransmits it to all the connected entities. This functionality
may be viewed as a broadcast channel. When a ﬂow is oriented, it is not only
received by the addressed destinations but also by all of the systems connected
to this channel. The functionalities which propagate data ﬂows are speciﬁed
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Fig. 5. The channel functionality CPN model
by CPN sub-nets that receive a token from a functionality and send replica
to all the other connected functionalities.
So, channel sub-networks are composed of a set of couples (place, transi-
tion) for each connected functionality (Fig. 5). Transitions are connected to
all other functionalities. For instance, tcifct1 is connected to funct2, funct3,
, functn. We also add a place (ci hist) which contains the list of all the to-
kens that have passed through the channel. It is connected to each transition
to ensure us that a token can pass once and only once through a channel
functionality.
3.2.3 The transform functionality
The transform functionality receives a data ﬂow on one of its two interfaces,
and according to transformation rules, it sends via the other interface this data
ﬂow or a transformation of it. The BNF deﬁnition of the syntax of transform
functionalities conﬁguration is as follows:
<TransformConﬁguration> ::=
[<interface> “→”<interface><rule>]
[<interface> “←” <interface><rule>]
<rule> :: = [<name> “=”] <roles list>
<roles list> ::= <role> | <role> “,” <roles list>
Consequently, transform CPN sub-nets change the color of some tokens ac-
cording to the transformation rules. We set up the functions on the post-arcs
transitions to change the color of the token (Transf funct1 and Transf funct2
in Fig. 6). Moreover, if a functionality can transform a ﬂow, it should be
able to recover the original ﬂow (see section 7.1.1). We also add two places
(hist tfi fct1 fct2 and hist tfi fct2 fct1) to save traces of all the ﬂows that
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Fig. 6. The transform functionality CPN model
have passed through this functionality.
3.2.4 The ﬁlter functionality
The ﬁlter functionality stops or forwards a data ﬂow. We ﬁnd this functionality
in ﬁrewalls, Application Level Gateways or ﬁltering routers. But we restrict
it to only connect two functionalities. The ﬁltering rules explicitly express
the permitted ﬂows between its two interfaces. If they are preceded by “EF”
then they arrive untransformed from an end-ﬂow functionality, else if they are
preceded by “TR” then they have been modiﬁed by a transform functionality.
The BNF deﬁnition of the syntax of ﬁlter functionalities conﬁguration is as
follows:
<FilterConﬁguration> ::=
[ <interface> “→” <interface> <rules>] [“;”]
[ <interface> “←” <interface> <rules>]
<rules> ::=
<name> “=” [“EF” <ﬂow list>] [“TR” <ﬂow list>]
<ﬂow list> ::= <ﬂow> | <ﬂow> “,” <ﬂow list>
<ﬂow> ::= “(” <EF type> “,” <role> “)”
<EF type> ::= “AEF” | “PEF”
Consequently, the ﬁlter CPN sub-nets stops or not some tokens according
to their color and the ﬁltering rules (Fig.7). We represent the ﬁltering rules
by restricting the colors permitted by the transitions with guards (see section
7.1.2). Then, a token with a color that is not in the guard of a transition
cannot be ﬁred. The transition tfifct1fct2 (resp. tfifct2fct1 ) is used to ﬁlter
data ﬂows coming from funct1 (resp. funct2) to funct2 (resp. funct1). In
addition, we add two places (hist fi fct1 fct2 and hist fi fct2 fct1) to save
all the ﬂows that have passed through this functionality.
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3.3 Security analysis
We use the model checking technique to determine if a speciﬁcation satisﬁes
the security properties. Nevertheless, this technique is sensitive to the com-
binatorial explosion problem. Thus, we expose two theorems that allow us to
limit our analysis of the CPN to only two states of the reachability graph.
Theorem 3.1 There is one and only one dead state in the reachability graph
of a CPN produced by any speciﬁcation.
Proof. see section 7.2.1. 
Theorem 3.2 The analysis of the initial and dead states is necessary and
suﬃcient.
Proof. see section 7.2.2. 
The theorem 3.2 guarantees that we only have to study the initial and dead
states in the reachability graph. The ﬁrst theorem ensures us obtaining the
dead state by simulation. Consequently, there is no combinatorial explosion
problem for the dead state analysis and then big size speciﬁcations can be
studied.
We now present the security properties that the initial and dead state must
satisfy.
We use the following notation:
• FUNCT , the set of functionalities,
• FILTER, the set of ﬁlter functionalities,
• ACTIV E, the set of active end-ﬂow functionalities,
• PASSIV E, the set of passive end-ﬂow functionalities,
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• ROLES, the set of roles,
• SENDER = {AEF, PEF},
• Connected ⊆ FUNCT × FUNCT , the relation that deﬁnes direct connec-
tion between functionalities,
• Assigned : (ACTIV E ∪ PASSIV E) → 2ROLE , the relation that deﬁnes
the set of roles assigned to an end-ﬂow functionality,
• COLOR, the set of colors in the CPN,
• PLACE, the set of places in the CPN,
• Tokens : PLACE → Bag(COLOR), where Bag(COLOR) is the set of
multiset over COLOR. It provides the set of colored tokens present in a
place and a state.
For simplifying writing properties, we use the special character “ ” for
indicating that one of the possible values is a member of the variable type. The
expression state |= property denotes that the state in the CPN reachability
graph satisﬁes the property - si is the initial state and sf is the dead sate.
Now, we deﬁne the security properties.
Definition 3.3 Property of conﬁdentiality
Basically, the property of conﬁdentiality protects the data from unauthorized
disclosure. Thus, in our model, it prohibits an end-ﬂow functionality from
receiving at any time an untransformed data ﬂow from any unassigned role.
∀ef ∈ ACTIV E, ∀r ∈ ROLES, r /∈ Assigned(ef)
⇒ sf |=< , r, EF, >/∈ Tokens(ef rec) (2)
Definition 3.4 Property of integrity
Classically, the property of integrity prohibits non authorized entities from
any creation, modiﬁcation or destruction of objects. Then, in our model, this
property implies that an end-ﬂow functionality can only generate data ﬂows
through its assigned roles.
∀ef ∈ ACTIV E ∪ PASSIV E, ∀r ∈ ROLES, r /∈ Assigned(ef)
⇒ si |=< , r, , ef >/∈ Tokens(ef rec) (3)
Definition 3.5 Property of availability
This property stipulates that all the granted services must be available to
all the authorized entities. In the network environment, the data ﬂows cor-
responding to these services, must be able to travel between both devices.
Consequently, translating it in our model results in: all active (resp. passive)
end-ﬂow functionalities must be able to consume all the data ﬂows with an
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assigned role sent by every passive (resp. active) end-ﬂow functionality.
Let ACTIV Er = {efa ∈ ACTIV E|r ∈ Assigned(efa)}
PASSIV Er = {efp ∈ PASSIV E|r ∈ Assigned(efp)}
∀r ∈ ROLES, ∀efa ∈ ACTIV Er, ∀efp ∈ PASSIV Er,
sf |=< PEF, r, EF, efp >∈ Tokens(ef reca )∧ < AEF, r, EF, efa >∈ Tokens(ef recp )
(4)
As we intend to address devices conﬁgurations, we complete these classical
security properties with new ones.
Definition 3.6 Property of partitioning
With this propertiy, we wish to limit the propagation of data ﬂows as much as
possible. It declares that a data ﬂow can only pass a ﬁlter functionality that
is situated between the data ﬂow source and a possible correct destination.
Let ACTIV Er = {efa ∈ ACTIV E|r ∈ Assigned(efa)}
PASSIV Er = {efp ∈ PASSIV E|r ∈ Assigned(efp)}
∀f ∈ FILTER, ∀fct1, fct2 ∈ FUNCT, ∀r ∈ ROLES,
Connected(f, fct1) ∧ Connected(f, fct2)
∧ (sf |=< AEF, r, , >∈ Tokens(hist f fct1fct2) ⇒
∃efa ∈ ACTIV Er ∧ fct2 ∈ Path(f, efa))
∧ (sf |=< PEF, r, , >∈ Tokens(hist f fct1fct2)⇒
∃efp ∈ PASSIV Er ∧ fct2 ∈ Path(f, efp)) (5)
The two following constraints aim to suppress implemented ﬁltering or
transform rules that are not used in a usual context.
Definition 3.7 Non productive ﬁltering rule
Let f , be a ﬁlter functionality connected to the functionalities fct1 and fct2.
We say that the ﬁltering rule FRL, which lets the data ﬂow < s, r, t, ef > pass,
from fct1 to fct2, is non productive if this ﬂow never tries to pass through
the ﬁlter functionality.
Let the rule FRL =fct1 → fct2 t (s, r) where fct1, fct2 ∈ FUNCT,
t ∈ {EF, TR}, s ∈ AEF, PEF, r ∈ ROLES then FRL is non productive iﬀ
sf |=< s, r, t, >/∈ Tokens(hist f fct1fct2) (6)
Definition 3.8 Non productive transform rule
Let tf , be a transform functionality connected to the functionalities fct1 and
fct2. We say that the transform rule TRL, that transforms the data ﬂows
with the role r from fct1 to fct2 is non productive if any ﬂow with the role
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r pass through the transform functionality in the direction fct1-fct2 at any
time.
Let TRL = fct1 → fct2 r where fct1, fct2 ∈ FUNCT, r ∈ ROLE
then TRL is non productive iﬀ sf |=< , r, EF, >/∈ Tokens(hist f fct1fct2)
∨ < , r, TR, >/∈ Tokens(hist f fct2fct1) (7)
4 A network security policy evaluation example
In this example, we consider a traditional case of an enterprise network in-
frastructure. It is composed of a private network and a DMZ. The whole is
connected by an edge router. In the private network, an App Server server is
installed and a FTP server in the DMZ (Fig.8). The application level security
policy is a non hierarchical RBAC policy. It deﬁnes two user groups: the
group VPNmembers and the group Others. This organization is only based
on the granted privileges. The App Server server is dedicated only to services
used by the VPNmembers group. The FTP Server has two directories: /con-
ﬁdential and /pub. The directory conﬁdential contains data only accessible
by the VPNmembers users group. Data of the pub directory is accessible by
everyone. User1, User2, User3 and User4 belong to VPNmembers and Others
groups. User5 is only member of the Others group.
The application level security policy can be expressed as:
Permissions(VPNmembers) = {(+all access,FTP Server/conﬁdential),
(+all access, App Server)}
Permissions(Others) = {(+all access, FTP Server/pub)}
Fig.8 shows also the network topology speciﬁcation and the network level
security policy implemented in our language. We have also appended the
name used in the CPN speciﬁcation to each functionality. First of all, we point
out that our approach does not take into account devices as entities, but is
based on the treatments carried out on data ﬂows. The Private Network, the
DMZ and the Internet interconnection infrastructures are speciﬁed thanks to
channel functionalities because we use their transmission functionality. This
approach of speciﬁcation with large granularity only considers the minimum
set of functionalities provided by these infrastructures: their interconnection
capability.
On the contrary it is possible to reﬁne a speciﬁcation as the edge router
shows it. It has obviously the interconnection functionality (the channel func-
tionality), setting as a security gateway with ﬁltering capabilities (the three
ﬁlter functionalities) and encryption mechanisms (the transform functionality,
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Fig. 8. Architecture and graphical sepciﬁcation of our VPN example
for example an IPsec module is installed). The modelling of routing is done
by ﬁltering rules on the ﬁlter functionalities.
The servers are speciﬁed by two PEF. The App Server server has the
VPNmembers role because only the users with the VPNmembers role have
access rights. The PEF corresponding to the FTP server has the roles Others
and VPNmembers because the permission (+all access, FTP Server/pub) is
assigned to the Others role and (+all access, FTP Server/conﬁdential) to the
VPNmembers role.
The devices of user1 and user2 are represented by a single AEF (EF1)
because user1 and user2 have the same roles (Others and VPNmembers) and
these AEF are connected to the same channel functionality thanks to the
concept of role which reduces the overall size of the speciﬁcation. In the
same way, the devices of user3 and user4 are speciﬁed by the AEF EF5. The
device of user5 is speciﬁed by the AEF EF4. Arbitrarily adding an AEF
with roles whose permissions are reduced makes it possible to deﬁne a degree
of conﬁdence (see [3] to get the complete deﬁnition of the “channel trust
property”) that can be granted to a channel functionality. In this example,
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we do not specify the structure of the Internet network, but it is perceived
as an interconnection environment where any connected user has at least the
permission to access the /pub directory of the FTP Server. This allows a
great ﬂexibility of speciﬁcation according to the level of desired and/or known
details.
We will now explain the security policy. The ﬁltering rules associated with
the ﬁlter functionalities of our example are:
• Rule1 = EF (AEF,Others), (AEF, V PNmembers)
• Rule2 = EF (PEF,Others)
• Rule3 = EF (PEF,Others), (PEF, V PNmembers), (AEF, V PNmembers)
• Rule4 = EF (AEF,Others), (AEF, V PNmembers)
• Rule5 =EF (PEF,Others), (AEF,Others)
TR(PEF, V PNmembers)
• Rule6 =EF (AEF,Others)
TR(AEF, V PNmembers)
Two transform functionalities are deﬁned to secure the VPNmembers role
data ﬂows on the Internet channel functionality. Indeed, users connected
to the Internet channel functionality with the Others role can never access
conﬁdential data at the FTP Server or the App Server.
We have used CPN/tool [40] to create the CPN (Fig. 10) associated to
the speciﬁcation. It shows the initial marking. Fig. 10 points out that the
CPN becomes complicated to be manually built for big size speciﬁcations. So,
we have developed using Java programming language a tool that automates
the evaluation task. It takes as an input a speciﬁcation ﬁle (Fig. 9). First, it
analyzes the syntax. If the syntax is correct, it generates the equivalent CPN
and checks all the properties. Finally, it produces as a result a ﬁle (Fig. 11)
indicating if the properties are satisﬁed or not. If a property is not satisﬁed,
the reason is explained.
In our example, the tool indicates (Fig. 11) that the property of conﬁ-
dentiality is satisﬁed and there is no non-productive transform rule. Never-
theless, the availability is not satisﬁed because ef2 cannot receive any ﬂow
with the role VPNmembers from ef5, ef1 cannot receive any ﬂow with the
role VPNmembers from ef3 and ef5 cannot receive any ﬂow with the role VP-
Nmembers from ef2. The partitioning property is not satisﬁed because of the
rule EF (AEF,Others) from tf1 to Internet in the ﬁlter functionality f3. And
ﬁnally, the ﬁltering rule EF (AEF, V PNmembers) from dmz to edge router
in the ﬁlter functionality f2 is non productive. To sum up, this speciﬁcation
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/* end-flow functionalities
definition */
<AEF>
#name = ef1
#roles = others, vpn-members;
#connection = private_network
<PEF>
#name = ef2
#roles = vpn-members;
#connection = private_network
<PEF>
#name = ef3
#roles = others, vpn-members;
#connection = dmz
<AEF>
#name = ef4
#roles = others;
#connection = internet
<AEF>
#name = ef5
#roles = others, vpn-members;
#connection = tf2
/*transform functionalities
definition */
<TRANSF>
#name = tf1
#connection1 = edge_router
#connection2 = f3
#rules_1->2 = vpn-members;
#rules_2->1 = NONE;
<TRANSF>
#name = tf2
#connection1 = ef5
#connection2 = internet
#rules_1->2 = vpn-members;
#rules_2->1 = NONE;
/* filter functionalities
defintion */
<FILTER>
#name = f1
#connection1 = private_network
#connection2 = edge_router
#rules_1->2 =
EF (AEF,others), (AEF, vpn-members);
TR NONE;
#rules_2->1 =
EF (PEF, others);
TR NONE;
<FILTER>
#name = f2
#connection1 = dmz
#connection2 = edge_router
#rules_1->2 =
EF (PEF,others), (PEF, vpn-members),
(AEF, vpn-members);
TR NONE;
#rules_2->1 =
EF (AEF, others), (AEF, vpn-
members);
TR NONE;
<FILTER>
#name = f3
#connection1 = tf1
#connection2 = internet
#rules_1->2 =
EF (PEF,others), (AEF, others);
TR (PEF, vpn-members);
#rules_2->1 =
EF (AEF, others);
TR (AEF, vpn-members);
/* channel functionalities
definition */
<CHANNEL>
#name = private_network
#connection = ef1, ef2, f1;
<CHANNEL>
#name = edge_router
#connection = f1, f2, tf1;
<CHANNEL>
#name = internet
#connection = f3, ef4, tf2;
<CHANNEL>
#name = dmz
#connection = ef3, f2;
Fig. 9. The speciﬁcation ﬁle
is not secure.
5 Related works
Diﬀerent works focus on suitable tool assistance. The approach of model
based management [18,20] utilizes object-oriented models of managed system
to support the derivation which is divided into three abstraction levels. The
designer graphically deﬁnes the three abstraction level models and the tool
guides the derivation. In addition, one of the most advanced tools [34] proposes
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Fig. 10. The CPN model of our VPN example
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Property of Confidentiality :
----------------------------
ef5 : OK
ef4 : OK
ef1 : OK
=> The property of confidentiality is satisfied
Property of Availability :
-------------------------
ef5 :
    no flow with the role vpn-members from ef2
ef4 : OK
ef1 :
    no flow with the role vpn-members from ef3
ef3 : OK
ef2 :
    no flow with the role vpn-members from ef5
=> The property of availability is not satisfied
Non Productive Transform Rules :
-------------------------------
tf2 :
    rules 1 -> 2 : OK
    rules 2 -> 1 : OK
tf1 :
    rules 1 -> 2 : OK
    rules 2 -> 1 : OK
=> There is no non productive rule
Non Productive Filtering Rules :
-------------------------------
f3
    rules 1 -> 2 :  OK
    rules 2 -> 1 :  OK
f2
    rules 1 -> 2 : [ EF (AEF, vpn-members) ],
    rules 2 -> 1 :  OK
f1
    rules 1 -> 2 :  OK
    rules 2 -> 1 :  OK
=> There is one or more non productive rule
Partitioning Property :
----------------------
f3 :
    Rule 1 -> 2 :
       [ EF (AEF ,others) ]
    Rule 2 -> 1 : OK
f2 :
    Rule 1 -> 2 : OK
    Rule 2 -> 1 : OK
f1 :
    Rule 1 -> 2 : OK
    Rule 2 -> 1 : OK
=> There is one or more partitioning problem
Fig. 11. The evaluation result ﬁle
to logically model network architecture without considering the speciﬁcities of
the devices such as vendor or version. Then, the designer deﬁnes the network
security policy (IPsec tunnels, NAT, ﬁrewall rules) which is translated into
each speciﬁc device conﬁguration language. These tools facilitate the design
and the deployment of network security policies, but they do not guarantee the
correctness of the security policy, i.e., the carried out decisions are relevant.
Most of the network security analysis techniques (for example [1]) only
check rules conﬂicts. They do not consider the global security policy. The
work [10,11] is really interesting because it proposes a solution that formally
evaluates IPsec VPNs. It models the network on a directed bipartite graph.
The nodes of the graph are areas, collections of hosts and networks which are
similar in terms of security policy; and devices, which are dual homed hosts
or packet ﬁltering/IPsec routers connecting the areas and moving packets
between them. Nevertheless, the users are ambiguously considered. That
implies that all hosts in a given area own the same set of privileges.
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6 Conclusion
The design of a security policy becomes increasingly diﬃcult because of the
complexity of the factors to consider. The common approach of deﬁning diﬀer-
ent abstraction levels, up from the objectives till the devices conﬁgurations, is
used to overcome the problem. Some existing tools implement this approach.
Nevertheless, a formal and automatic evaluation of decisions must complete
this achievement.
In this paper, we have presented a tool that realizes a formal evaluation of
the network security policy. The language is quiet simple, but it owns the CPN
formal analysis power. Moreover, we have demonstrated that all the deﬁned
security properties are checked at the initial and dead state. Consequently,
our approach is not vulnerable to the combinatorial explosion problem and
then is applicable to complex studies.
At present, we are testing our approach through diﬀerent case studies to
enhance our method. In addition, our future work will be focused on validating
the real conﬁgurations on devices. Our tool - being independent from the
security technologies implemented on the devices, conﬁnes itself to validating
security mechanisms constraints. Therefore, we are working on bridging this
gap thanks to the Common Information Model (CIM) [35] deﬁned by the
DMTF task force to harmonize the management systems. Hence, we could
interconnect our work with management platforms.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix A
We deﬁne the equivalence between the deﬁnitions of ﬁltering and transform
rules in our speciﬁcation language and the generated CPN sub-net model.
7.1.1 Transform rules translation
Consider:
• TFi a transform functionality,
• funct1 and funct2 the two functionalities connected to TFi,
• Ci the conﬁguration of TFi,
• tfi a transform CPN sub-network,
• Transf funct1 the function associated to the ttffct1fct2 post-arc,
• Transf funct2 the function associated to the ttffct2fct1 post-arc.
We say that TFi ≡TF tfi iﬀ
Ci = funct1 → funct2 r1, r2, . . . rk
funct1 ← funct2 rk+1, . . . rn
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and
∀E ∈ {AEF, PEF},
T ransf funct1(< E, r1, EF, >) =< E, r1, TR, > ∧
. . .
T ransf funct1(< E, rk, EF, >) =< E, rk, TR, > ∧
Transf funct1(< E, rk+1, TR, >) =< E, rk+1, EF, > ∧
. . .
T ransf funct1(< E, rn, TR, >) =< E, rn, EF, > ∧
∀ < E,R, T, >∈ {AEF, PEF} × ROLES × {EF, TR} ×NAME
\{< E, r1, EF, >, . . . , < E, rk, EF, >,< E, rk+1, TR, >, . . . ,
< E, rn, TR, >},
T ransf funct1(< E,R, T, >) =< E,R, T, >,
and
∀E ∈ {AEF, PEF},
T ransf funct2(< E, rk+1, EF, >) =< E, rk+1, TR, > ∧
. . . ∧
Transf funct2(< E, rn, EF, >) =< E, rn, TR, > ∧
Transf funct2(< E, r1, TR, >) =< E, r1, EF, > ∧
. . . ∧
Transf funct2(< E, rk, TR, >) =< E, rk, EF, >,
∀ < E,R, T, >∈
{AEF, PEF} × ROLES × {EF, TR} ×NAME
\{< E, r1, EF, >, . . . , < E, rk, EF, >,< E, rk+1, TR, >, . . . ,
< E, rn, TR, >},
T ransf funct2(< E,R, T, >) =< E,R, T, >.
7.1.2 Filtering rules translation
Consider:
• Fi a ﬁlter functionality,
• funct1 and funct2 the two functionalities connected to Fi,
• Ci the conﬁguration of Fi,
• and fi a ﬁlter CPN sub-network.
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We say that Fi ≡F fi iﬀ
Ci = funct1 → funct2
Rule1 = EF (e1, r1)(e2, r2) . . . (ek, rk)
TR(ek+1, rk+1) . . . (en, rn);
funct1 ← funct2
Rule2 = EF (e′1, r′1) . . . (e′j , r′j)
TR(e′j+1, r′j+1) . . . (e′m, r′m);
and
guard(tfifct1fct2 ) = [< e1, r1, EF, >,< e2, r2, EF, >, . . . , < ek, rk, EF, >
,< ek+1, rk+1, TR, >, . . . , < en, rn, TR, >]
guard(tfifct2fct1 ) = [< e′1, r′1, EF, >, . . . , < e′j , r′j , EF, >,
< e′j+1, r′j+1, TR, >, . . . , < e′m, r′m, TR, >].
7.2 Appendix B
We present the proofs of both theorems.
7.2.1 Proof of theorem 3.1
First, we prove that all CPN generated from any speciﬁcation is K-bounded.
We use the following notation:
• P is the ﬁnite set of places in the CPN that have the color domain FLOW
(i.e., all places excluding the places ci hist that have the color domain
FLOW LIST ) ,
• PreP : P → 2P , the relation that deﬁnes the set of places which have one
of their post-arcs connected to the same transition as one of the pre-arcs of
a place in the CPN,
• PEF =
⋃
∀i
{ef emi }, the ﬁnite set of places ef emi ,
• nb tok : P → N, provides the number of tokens that have passed in one
place,
• < x1, x2, . . . xn > a structural path between x1 and xn in a CPN where
∀i > 0, xi ∈ P, xi ∈ PreP(xi+1),
• [x1  xn] the set of the possible structural paths between the places x1 and
xn.
By construction, we have:
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(i) ∀p ∈ P\PEF , nb tok(p) ≤
∑
∀x∈PreP(p)
nb tok(x)
(ii) ∀ef emi ∈ PEF , nb tok(ef emi ) = ki where ki is the the number of tokens in
ef emi in the initial state
(iii) ∀i, nb tok(ci hist) = 1 because each ci hist contains an ordered list of
tokens.
So, ∀p ∈ P\PEF , nb tok(p) ≤
∑
∀x∈PreP
nb tok(x)
≤
∑
∀x∈PreP (p)
∑
∀y∈PreP(x)
nb tok(y)
We can note it, ∀p ∈ P\PEF , ∀y ∈ P, < y, . . . p >, nb tok(p) ≤
∑
[yp]
nb tok(y)
By recursion, we obtain
∀p ∈ P\PEF , ∀ef emi ∈ P, < ef emi , . . . p >, nb tok(p) ≤
∑
[efemi p]
nb tok(ef emi )
(i) if there is only one structural path between two places then∑
[efemi p]
nb tok(ef emi ) =
∑
ki.
(ii) if there exists cycles in structural paths - e.g. < x2, x3 > is a cycle in the
path < x1, x2, x3, x2, x3, x4 > - then there is an inﬁnite number of pos-
sible paths between x1 and x4, as < x1, x2, x3, x2, x3, x2, x3, x2, x3, x4 >
because a token that can pass two time through a place can pass in-
ﬁnitely. However by construction, a cycle in the CPN implies that the
associated speciﬁcation contains a cycle too (i.e., there are diﬀerent paths
between two functionalities). And always by construction, there are at
least two channel functionalities in a cycle. A channel functionality re-
transmits a token with a speciﬁc color < a, b, c, d > once. Considering
that each ﬂow can only take two possible colors < a, b, EF, d > and
< a, b, TR, d >, a cycle can be covered once by a data ﬂow. Conse-
quently,
∑
[efemi p]
nb tok(ef emi ) <∞
To sum up:
(i) ∀p ∈ P\PEF , nb tok(p) <∞
(ii) ∀ef emi ∈ PEF , nb tok(ef emi ) = ki
(iii) ∀i, nb tok(ci hist) = 1
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So, any CPN associated to a speciﬁcation is K bounded. As a consequence,
the CPN is K-bounded and there a reachability graph can be computed.
Moreover, each token will be consumed by an end-ﬂow or stopped by a
ﬁlter or a channel functionality. They are also consumed by all the historic
places. Then there is one or more dead state.
In addition, there is no choice (i.e., a place with diﬀerent post-arcs) in the
produced CPN, and tokens are arranged in order in the ﬂow list of the ci hist
places. Consequently, there is only one dead state.
7.2.2 Proof of theorem 3.2
For this proof, we use the theorem 3.1 which demonstrates that there is only
one dead state in the reachability graph.
The property of conﬁdentiality and the deﬁnition of non productive ﬁlter-
ing/transform rules state that a speciﬁc place must never contains a speciﬁc
colored token. In each case, this place does not have any post-arc. For that
reason, if this place contains at a speciﬁc state a colored token then for all
future states it contains this token. As a consequence, if the place never con-
tains a colored token then the place does not contain the token at the dead
state. And if the dead state does not contain a colored token, then there is
no state such that the place contains the token.
Inversely, the properties of availability and partitioning impose that there
must exists a state such that a speciﬁc place with no post-arc contains a
speciﬁc colored token. If such a state exists then the dead state satisﬁes the
property. Moreover, if the place contains the token in the dead state then
such a state exists.
Finally, the property of integrity states that the place ef rec must never
contain some colored tokens accordingly to its assigned roles. This place does
not have pre-arc. So, if the place contains the token in a state, then there is
no past state such that the place does not contain this token. Hence, if the
place does not contain the token at the initial state then the place will never
contain the token. And if the place never contains the token then the place
doesn’t contain the token at the initial state.
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